

**Social Norms, Dual Identities, and National Attachment:
How the Perceived Patriotism of Group Members Influences Muslim Americans**

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ABSTRACT

What causes individuals to express patriotism? We argue that Americans' symbolic patriotism stems in part from social influence, with norms in relevant identity groups influencing individuals' patriotism levels. Given that Americans identify with multiple groups—national, racial, and religious, among others—many groups are potentially influential in this regard. We focus in this article on Muslim Americans, an especially diverse group, conducting an experiment with approximately 450 Muslim Americans from across the U.S. We randomly assigned participants to stimuli that portrayed either Muslim Americans or Americans in general as either highly patriotic or unpatriotic. Perceived patriotic norms among Americans and Muslim Americans strongly—and equally—influenced participants' expressions of patriotism, although unpatriotic norms did not influence participants' patriotism. In addition, patriotic and unpatriotic norms among fellow national and subgroup members influenced participants' evaluations of government. As predicted, these norms did not influence intended participation, suggesting the normative import of symbolic patriotism may be limited. Finally, African American Muslims, a minority subgroup of this population, were less responsive to Muslim American patriotic norms than were non-African American Muslims. The results support the conceptualization of patriotism as a social norm and demonstrate the political relevance of Americans' multiple identities.

Keywords: patriotism; social influence; norms; identity; Muslim Americans; African Americans

Both scholars and laypeople have demonstrated an intense interest in the American public's patriotism. Thus far, this interest largely has been descriptive in nature, with claims and counterclaims regarding "how patriotic" the American citizenry and particular subgroups may be. What has been lost in the conversation is a second and equally important question: What causes people to express greater or lesser patriotism? Given the value many Americans rest on patriotism, this question of causation is potentially of great normative importance.

Scholars increasingly argue that patriotism in the U.S. is a social norm (see Schildkraut 2011), with Americans reporting high levels of national pride as well as patriotic behaviors, such as flying the flag (Pew 2010a, 2010b). Individuals adhere to norms in large part because of social influence: people feel compelled (some would say pressured) to follow popular norms, and therefore they conform (e.g., Brown 2000; Sinclair 2012; Suhay 2014; Turner 1991).¹ It is the rare individual who completely resists the pull of the majority. Thus, we argue that perceptions of whether or not patriotism is a social norm will tend to influence an individual's own expressed level of patriotism.

This straight-forward claim is complicated by two realities, however. First, all Americans are members of multiple social groups. Identification with multiple communities (e.g., national

¹ Norms do not only "persuade" because of peer pressure. They also can convey helpful information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 1998). E.g., knowing that peers prefer one presidential candidate over another suggests that candidate may be more competent and/or better represent group interests. This said, as a more affective and behavioral phenomenon, patriotism is likely more influenced by social conformity than such informational processes.

origin, racial, ethnic, and religious groups) is likely accompanied by adherence to multiple groups' norms. Second, because Americans belong to multiple subgroups, any given subgroup of the American polity will itself usually be heterogeneous. This means that an identification with one subgroup (e.g., racial) may place a person in the majority *or* the minority of a second subgroup (e.g., religious). Generally speaking, research suggests that individuals whose additional identities place them in the minority of a particular group will conform less to that group's norms than those whose identities place them in the majority (Turner 1991).

Applying this logic to patriotism, we argue, first, that Americans tend to be influenced by perceived levels of patriotism among the broader American community *as well as* in those narrower subgroups to which they belong. Second, variation in conformity *within* a subgroup to patriotic norms depends, in part, on a person's status as a majority or minority group member.

In this article, we focus on the influence of patriotic norms on expressed levels of patriotism among Muslim Americans. Studying this group offers several advantages. First, despite increasing societal interest in Americans who practice Islam, there continues to be a relative dearth of systematic empirical evidence about such individuals (Ahmed 2010; Haddad 2009). Second, studying U.S. Muslims allows us to test theoretical claims about the importance of group identity in social influence over patriotism because members of this group hold multiple salient identities. For example, most Muslims living in the U.S. identify with both Muslims *and* Americans to some extent (e.g., Esposito 2007). In addition, the Muslim American community includes individuals of varying races, ethnicities, and nationalities (see, e.g., Pew 2011). We focus in this article on the implications of a particularly important identity cleavage—that between African American and non-African American Muslims. Third, the

loyalty and patriotism of U.S. Muslims has been challenged in recent years, perhaps more so than any other American minority or immigrant group (Dorraj 2010; Kathwari, Martin, and Whitney 2007).² Some may suspect Muslim Americans to be unmoved by the patriotism of others, particularly non-Muslims; we disagree and test this hypothesis here.

We test our theoretical expectations with data from an experiment embedded in a national survey of approximately 450 Muslim Americans. To our knowledge, this represents the first large-scale experiment carried out with this population. We randomly assigned participants to stimuli that portrayed either Muslim Americans or Americans in general as either highly patriotic or unpatriotic. We then assessed the impact of these stimuli on participants' expressed attitudinal and behavioral patriotism as well as on two potentially related constructs (evaluations of government and political participation). The statistical results largely support our expectations.

Our findings have important implications for several literatures. We confirm the intuition generated—but not tested—by the patriotism literature that perceptions of group members' patriotism should influence an individual's own expressed level of patriotism. Our results also support this literature's conclusion that patriotism, at least as commonly

² We use the term “minority” in reference to Muslim and African Americans when signaling their numerical status within the U.S. as a whole. This said, while each group represents a minority subgroup of the U.S. population, Muslims and those with African ancestry of course represent majorities in many other spaces (both within the U.S. and elsewhere in the world). Thus, as with most groups, their minority status is context specific.

understood, is largely symbolic and disconnected from more substantive democratic participation. In addition, we contribute to the literatures on religious and racial groups in the U.S., demonstrating experimentally some of the politically relevant effects of identification with multiple groups as well as of intra-group divisions. Finally, this research contributes to the immigration literature, where claims about acculturation³ have rested largely on case studies and survey data, and researchers have made little use of controlled, randomized experiments.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to patriotism, resulting in a variety of definitions of patriotism and related concepts (see Huddy and Khateb 2007 for a recent review). We employ the most common understanding of patriotism—a combination of pride in, and attachment to (or love for), one’s nation (Huddy and Khateb 2007; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Li and Brewer 2004). We refer to this construct as “symbolic patriotism” (Huddy and Khateb 2007).⁴

³ Acculturation is different from assimilation. The former has a cultural focus, involving the adoption of values and norms prevalent in the new nation, whereas the latter involves the dissolution of group boundaries and identifications (Alba and Nee 2003; Barvosa 2010).

⁴ Despite some of the shortcomings of the “symbolic patriotism” concept, such as the fact that it is correlated with political conservatism (Huddy and Khateb 2007) and privileges blind commitment over engaged criticism (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Staub 1997), no scholarly consensus has formed around an alternate concept. Our view is that while symbolic patriotism

We follow previous literature in distinguishing patriotism from nationalism, i.e., a sense of national superiority and antipathy toward other nations (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Li and Brewer 2004; Skitka 2005). We also follow previous literature in distinguishing patriotism from national identity (see Schildkraut 2011 and Theiss-Morse 2009; although note that Huddy and Khateb 2007 argue that national identity is a distinct *form* of patriotism). Theoretically, patriotism is related to one's feelings about a political entity with geographic borders, a particular history, and associated symbols, whereas national identity relates to attitudes toward fellow compatriots (Theiss-Morse 2009; also see Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990). Patriotism and national identity are also empirically distinct. For example, greater or lesser identification as an "American" is not consistently linked to greater or lesser patriotism (Citrin and Sears 2014; Schildkraut 2011).

Behaviorally, patriotism is often closely linked to participation in public rituals and the display of positive symbols associated with one's nation, such as flags (Butz 2009; Schatz and Lavine 2007; Skitka 2005). Patriotism's political import extends beyond a psychological attachment to country and public ritual; it is related to what many consider to be normatively more important constructs, such as evaluations of the trustworthiness of elected officials (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). This should not be surprising. Pride signals a strongly positive evaluation of some object; thus, pride in one's nation implies that, at least generally speaking, one approves of institutions and leaders closely associated with the nation.

is complicated normatively, with some obvious negative aspects, it nevertheless captures an important, and very real, empirical phenomenon in evidence in the U.S. and the world.

This said, counter to conventional wisdom, some types of patriotism—including symbolic patriotism—are *not* associated with greater political participation (Huddy and Khateb 2007; Schatz and Lavine 2007; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Schildkraut 2011). This may be due to the fact that symbolic patriotism reflects emotional attachment to, and positive evaluation of, the nation and its symbols; as a result, it is associated with symbolic motives, such as self-esteem enhancement, rather than instrumental or other political motives (Schatz and Lavine 2007). To the extent that patriotism overlaps with authoritarian overreliance on national leaders, it may even discourage participation (Huddy and Khateb 2007; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).

Patriotism, Social Norms, and Identity

Whether studying Muslim Americans or other U.S. subgroups, patriotism is especially ripe for a study of the influence of social norms. Much scholarship in this area has focused on the nature of patriotism and its consequences (see above). While some have explored various influences on patriotism and related constructs (e.g., Anderson 2006; Druckman 1994), no published scholarship of which we are aware has examined the causal impact of social norms on individuals' stated attachment to the nation in which they reside.

Yet, research suggests social norms ought to be relevant to individuals' patriotism levels. Patriotism itself is a norm in the U.S. (Schildkraut 2011; Smith and Jarkko 1998). Norms communicate expectations about what people *are* like and what they *should* be like (Schildkraut 2011). In other words, they tend to have both descriptive (describing the behavior of the majority) and prescriptive (prescribing "good" or "expected" behavior) components. Researchers have long known that group norms are powerful influences on political attitudes

and behaviors (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Gerber and Rogers 2009). Thus, as norms—or, more accurately, *perceptions* of norms—change, so do individuals’ attitudes and behaviors.

Norms tend to inspire conformity for two linked reasons. First, people often seek social approval via in-group conformity due to “self-interested” reputational concerns (Deutsch and Gerard 1965; Sinclair 2012). Second, people also conform to in-group peers for deeper psychological reasons linked to subjective social identity—in-group members provide a person with strong cues regarding what are appropriate attitudes and behaviors for him or her (Suhay 2014; Turner 1991). Our working assumption in this article is that, in most instances of conformity—including the conformity observed in this study—both mechanisms are in operation.⁵

As is already clear, one cannot easily discuss social norms without also discussing groups. For starters, referring to a “majority” view or behavior assumes a defined population (i.e., a group). Perhaps for this reason, the terms “social norm” and “group norm” often seem to be used interchangeably. Furthermore, individuals typically feel motivated to subscribe to the perceived norms of groups with which they identify, while out-group norms are either ignored or lead to boomerang effects (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner 1990; Brown 2000; Turner 1991). Complicating this straight-forward set of claims is the reality that

⁵ We do not attempt to test these two micro-level mechanisms or assess which may be the stronger of the two. The operation of these mechanisms is a subject ripe for further research.

nearly all individuals identify with multiple social groups (Crenshaw 1991). Thus, individuals are likely influenced by multiple groups' norms (Brown 2000; Turner 1991).

Which groups are most relevant to individuals and, therefore, most influential? National identity is particularly important to many Americans, as are racial/ethnic and religious identifications (Theiss-Morse 2009). Unfortunately, much scholarship on racial, ethnic, religious, and other U.S. minority subgroups—both respectful (e.g., Dawson 1994) and disparaging (e.g., Huntington 2011)—attends almost exclusively to such individuals' identification with the subgroup. This can leave the reader with the impression that U.S. minority group members identify *only* with subgroup members (to the exclusion of the national group) and, thus, subscribe only to subgroup norms. But so-called “hyphenated Americans” have been found to identify with both the minority subgroup(s) to which they belong *as well as* Americans generally. Citrin and Sears (2014) find evidence for widespread “soft multiculturalism” in the U.S. in which ethnic and national allegiances are complementary, not competing. Furthermore, if forced to choose between an American and a subgroup identity, most American minority group members prioritize their American identity (Citrin and Sears 2014; Schildkraut 2011). It is likely for this reason that U.S. minority group members tend to pay attention to both subgroup and national norms (see, e.g., Ahmed 2010; Alba and Nee 2005).⁶ Similarly, scholarship on

⁶ Note that national and minority subgroup norms do not always differ. Schildkraut (2011, ch. 3) finds that immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities tend to define American identity in ways highly similar to non-immigrant whites (e.g., stating that patriotism, democratic involvement, hard work, and political freedom are all important aspects of being an American). Thus,

racial, religious, and other subgroups of the American polity sometimes treats these groups as if they were monolithic, without important cleavages of their own. As discussed further below, such cleavages can also affect a person's likelihood of subscribing to a particular group's norms.

Studying Muslim American Patriotism

Most Muslims in the U.S. identify both as Muslims *and* Americans (Esposito 2007; Haddad 2009; Lin 2009). On the one hand, an important tenet of Islam is that there exists an "ummah," or worldwide community of believers. This social identity is supposed to be of primary importance to Muslims, transcending national and ethnic boundaries (Esposito 2002). On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans say Muslims who come to the U.S. want to adopt American customs and ways of life (Pew 2011). And, despite the fact that approximately two-thirds of Muslim Americans are immigrants, approximately 70% are citizens (Pew 2011). Thus, we argue that individual Muslim Americans' expressions of patriotism are likely influenced by norms from both of these communities.

These dual identifications, in combination with expectations generated by the conformity literature (discussed above), suggest the following set of four hypotheses with respect to our study on the influence of patriotic norms. **H1:** Perceiving high levels of patriotism among fellow Muslim Americans will increase participants' symbolic patriotism. **H2:** Perceiving low levels of patriotism among fellow Muslim Americans will decrease participants' symbolic

politically relevant social influences from multiple groups can push in the same direction. In fact, immigrants seeking to acculturate often learn about mainstream norms in the national culture *through* nearly identical norms in the immigrant community (King 2000, 117-119).

patriotism. **H3:** Perceiving high levels of patriotism among fellow Americans in general will increase participants' symbolic patriotism. **H4:** Perceiving low levels of patriotism among fellow Americans in general will decrease participants' symbolic patriotism.

As discussed previously, symbolic patriotism is associated with some variables of great normative import, such as trust in government. On the other hand, several studies have demonstrated that symbolic patriotism is *not* positively associated with other variables of normative import, such as political participation. In keeping with these general findings from the patriotism literature, we offer two additional hypotheses. **H5:** Perceived levels of patriotism among Muslim Americans and Americans in general will influence participants' evaluations of the U.S. government (in the corresponding direction, e.g., with higher perceived patriotism leading to greater trust). **H6:** Perceived levels of patriotism will *not* influence Muslim Americans' intentions to participate in democratic politics.

Our last two hypotheses relate to the complexities of Muslim Americans' identities. As discussed above, similar to other American racial and religious minority subgroups, Muslim Americans tend to identify *both* with Americans as a whole *and* with other U.S. Muslims more specifically. Thus, we expect (**H7**): on average, equivalent norms will have similar effects on participants whether attributed to Muslim Americans or Americans in general.

We acknowledge that some readers may find reason to question this hypothesis. Some social psychology research on intergroup contact suggests Muslim Americans may be *more* influenced by fellow Muslim Americans than Americans in general—contra our “equal influence” hypothesis—because generic “American” influence threatens their sense of distinct subgroup identity (see Gonzalez and Brown, 2006, for a review). However, contact studies also

find many relevant instances where subgroups do not feel threatened by appeals to a superordinate group identity, for example, when a subgroup is non-nested (Hornsey and Hogg 2000) or has a lower status (Gonzalez and Brown 2006). Furthermore, Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten (2010) found that some Dutch Muslims *preferred* superordinate group goals when their Muslim identity was made salient. Given the mix of results in this literature, we find no reason to propose an alternate to our straight-forward hypothesis that Muslim Americans, as dual identifiers, will find subgroup and national group norms approximately equally appealing.

Finally, Muslim Americans differ in terms of their race / ethnicity, gender, national origin, and type of Islam practiced, among other things (Gallup and the Coexist Foundation 2009; Pew 2011). Just as various subgroup identities can compete with a person's American identity, they also can compete with a person's *Muslim* American identity. Perhaps the most obvious division within the Muslim American community is that between African American and non-African American Muslims. In many respects, these two groups represent distinct communities (Ahmed 2010; Akhtar 2011; Esposito 2002; Smith 2010). A majority of the Muslim American population is first generation immigrant, whereas the majority of African American Muslims are native born (Pew 2011). Islam is relatively new to African Americans⁷ and, at least until the 1970s, most African American Muslims' religious beliefs and practices differed considerably from other Muslims (Esposito 2002; Smith 2010; Turner 1997). African American Muslims differ from their counterparts in other ways, including their ancestors' history of

⁷ Early in the nation's history, many newly arrived African slaves were Muslim; however, the vast majority were forced to convert to Christianity (Esposito 2002; Smith 2010).

slavery and their greater experience with racial (as opposed to religious) discrimination (Jackson 2005) as well as their political views (Akhtar 2011). In fact, generally speaking, it is not possible to consider African American's practice of Islam apart from the unique struggles for equality that made Islam's central tenets particularly attractive to them (Berg 2005).

While tensions are felt on both sides, we concentrate on African American Muslims, given their minority status within the Muslim American community (Pew 2011). Because the majority of Muslim Americans today are not African American, African American Muslims identify less with the "Muslim American community" than do non-African American Muslims (see Jackson 2005). For this reason, African American Muslims likely conform less to perceived Muslim American norms than do their non-African American counterparts. Thus, our final hypothesis is as follows. **H8:** African American Muslims will be less responsive to perceived patriotic norms in the Muslim American community than non-African American Muslims.⁸

METHODOLOGY

We explore these topics with data from an experiment embedded in a national survey of Muslim Americans carried out via telephone during the winter and spring of 2009. Trained call operators in a CATI-equipped lab worked under the supervision of one of the authors. Most of

⁸ Of course, one could explore many additional moderators besides race. Perhaps the best second candidate is citizenship status. Unfortunately, because of the political sensitivity of this question and the likelihood that asking it would unnecessarily alarm many participants (perhaps leading to significant attrition), the survey did not contain this measure. We report on additional moderation analyses in the discussion section.

the surveys were conducted in English; however, when the initial English-speaking operators were made aware of the fact that a participant's first language was Arabic, or that the subject preferred that the interview be conducted in Arabic, an Arabic-speaking operator made subsequent contact at a mutually agreed-upon time.

All participants were asked "What is your religious preference?" toward the beginning of the study. Only those who identified themselves as Muslims were asked to continue. A total of 445 Muslim American participants completed enough of the study to be included in our analyses below. Participants first answered questions as a part of a pre-test interview; participants were then randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups or a control group; finally, participants answered a number of political and other questions in a post-test interview.

Prospective participants were chosen in the following way: Subject contact information was culled from lists of prospective voters compiled by the political data management service Aristotle.⁹ We compiled an overall frame of persons in the database with common Muslim surnames,¹⁰ and individuals were randomly sampled from that frame. Once a household was

⁹ The use of this database implies that our sample will be skewed at least somewhat toward Muslim Americans who are citizens. We did not ask a citizenship question due to the fear this would raise suspicions regarding our intentions and lower study participation; however, we can report that approximately 50% of our sample was registered to vote and 45% were born in the U.S. We discuss the sample in more detail below.

¹⁰ Past surveys of Muslim Americans, e.g, Zogby Project MAPS (see Djupe and Greene 2007) and Pew (2007), have used the "common Muslim name" method to create a sampling frame for at

reached using the telephone number associated with a chosen individual, we used the “last birthday” method to choose a survey participant from within the household at random.

While experiments have the advantage of strong internal validity, they typically are weaker with respect to external validity, in part because they tend to use convenience samples (Kinder and Palfrey 1993; Sears 1986). Our large, diverse sample strengthens the external validity of our experimental results. We compare demographic characteristics of our sample to a representative survey of U.S. Muslims conducted by Pew in 2007, only two years before our study was conducted. See Table 1. Some modest differences appear: Our sample is somewhat younger, better educated, more likely to be born in the U.S., and more likely to be Sunni as opposed to “other.” But, overall, we appear to have captured much true variation in the U.S. Muslim community. That said, given the use of the Aristotle database and the focus on common Muslim surnames when sampling, we do *not* claim that this sample is representative; therefore, we cannot use the sample to draw inferences about Muslim American patriotism generally. We restrict our analysis and discussion to the experimental results.

[Table 1 here]

least a portion of their sample. A problem with this method is that lists are somewhat skewed toward Arabic names, resulting in an under-sampling of non-Arab Muslims. Unfortunately, the 2007 Pew survey discussed below does not contain the regional ancestry identifier that would allow us to assess whether we have under-sampled non-Arabs. This said, our sample does include a large percentage of Asians and especially African Americans (who may have been given Muslim names at birth or taken them upon conversion), suggesting the bias is not severe.

Experimental Design

Given experiments' superiority over other empirical methods with respect to causal inference (Kinder and Palfrey 1993), we use an experiment to assess the influence of social group norms on Muslim Americans' expressed symbolic patriotism and potentially related variables. All participants were randomly assigned (via the CATI software) to either one of four treatment conditions or the control group, which received no stimuli.

Each assigned treatment discussed majority opinion and behavior among either Muslim Americans or Americans more generally.¹¹ The Muslim Americans Patriotic treatment read: *A recent survey of American Muslims found a majority of Muslim citizens actively participate in civic life. 75% of Muslims said they celebrate the 4th of July holiday. 80% of American Muslims with young children said they would be pleased if their children someday had careers in public service, such as becoming a police officer or firefighter. Finally, a majority of the Muslims surveyed said they at least sometimes display the American flag.*

The Muslim Americans Unpatriotic treatment reversed the "patriotic" norms depicted above, noting that the same percentages of American Muslims reported *not* holding these opinions or engaging in these behaviors: *A recent survey of American Muslims found a majority of Muslim citizens do not participate in civic life. 75% of Muslims said they ignore the 4th of July holiday. 80% of American Muslims with young children said they would discourage their children*

¹¹ To maintain experimental control over treatments across conditions, polling information was fabricated. Note that participants were debriefed regarding the potentially misleading nature of the information they had received after completing the study.

from having careers in public service, such as becoming a police officer or firefighter. Finally, a majority of the Muslims surveyed said they never display the American flag.

The other two treatments (Americans Patriotic and Americans Unpatriotic¹²) repeated the wording of the above stimuli but substituted simply “Americans” for “American Muslims” and “U.S. citizens” for “Muslim citizens.”

The question of what symbolizes patriotism for many Muslims in the U.S. was important in our creation of these treatments. We surmised that celebrating the 4th of July and flying the American flag would efficiently convey the patriotism of peers. This is in keeping with a concern with these behaviors in a Council on American-Islamic Relations survey (2006) and mirrors behaviors widely considered patriotic by Americans (Morales 2008). Our treatments also include mention of two public service career choices—police officer and firefighter. Selection of these careers reflects Islam’s concern with public service and promoting the common good (see Ellison 2011; McCloud 2004). While most Americans probably perceive military service to be more patriotic than these “first responder” posts (Morales 2008), the military is controversial among Muslim Americans because of the history of U.S. military intervention in predominantly Muslim countries. We also considered elected office to be an inappropriate “patriotic” career

¹² For some readers, the information in this stimulus will seem obviously counter to reality, as patriotism tends to run high in the American population (Bowman and Rugg 2010). This said, this fact is not necessarily well-known among ordinary Americans unfamiliar with public opinion data; further, the fact that many Muslim Americans are embedded in immigrant communities will create uncertainty among them as to the exact nature of American social norms.

choice because members of Congress, as well as state and local officeholders, are not held in high regard by the average U.S. citizen (e.g., see Jones 2007).

Dependent Measures

The post-test survey (following the experimental stimuli) contained the various dependent measures. Below, we first examine four dependent variables that measure two aspects of symbolic patriotism. We assessed participants' behavioral patriotism by asking them about their intention to fly the American flag (FLAG) and to celebrate the 4th of July (FOURTH).

Attitudinal patriotism was measured with questions on whether participants would rather be a U.S. citizen than a citizen of another nation (CITIZEN) and pride in being American (PRIDE).¹³ We also examine two variables that measured participants' evaluations of governmental officials as well as the U.S. system of governance: whether they believe U.S. government officials are corrupt (CORRUPT) and whether democracy is the best form of government (DEMOCRACY).¹⁴

¹³ Questions similar to FLAG and FOURTH appeared on a survey of Muslim American voters (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2006). A close variant of CITIZEN has appeared on the World Values Survey, among others (Bowman and Rugg 2010). PRIDE is a Likert variant of one of the most common survey measures of patriotism (Bowman and Rugg 2010). These latter two questions are worded in such a way that noncitizens are able to agree; however, like many patriotism questions, recent immigrants with strong ties to their nation of origin will be less likely to agree (Citrin and Sears 2014). We discuss this further in the Discussion section.

¹⁴ One can also think of these questions as measuring, respectively, "incumbent-based" and "regime-based" trust (see Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990).

Finally, we examine three measures of intended political participation. Participants were asked whether they planned to contact their member of Congress (CONTACT), persuade peers to be more active politically (PERSUADE), and support a local candidate's election (SUPPORT).¹⁵ The precise wording of the dependent variables is available in Table 2. For each, greater patriotism, trust, support for democracy, and participation received higher values.

[Table 2 here]

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

We begin by examining Hypotheses 1-4. Using ordered probit regression, we first regressed the four symbolic patriotism dependent variables (FLAG, FOURTH, CITIZEN, and PRIDE) on four dummy variables representing each of the treatment groups. The control group was excluded for the sake of comparison. See Table 3.

The results are highly consistent across the four dependent variables; we therefore discuss them in general terms. The results strongly support Hypothesis 1 (Muslim American patriotic norms influential) and Hypothesis 3 (American patriotic norms influential). The coefficients on the *Muslim Americans Patriotic* and *Americans Patriotic* variables are each positive as expected and statistically significant ($p < .001$).¹⁶ That said, Hypothesis 2 (Muslim American *unpatriotic* norms influential) and Hypothesis 4 (American *unpatriotic* norms influential) are not supported. Nearly all of the coefficients on the *Muslim Americans*

¹⁵ No voting questions were asked because, at the time of the study, the next national election (2010 Congressional) was close to two years away.

¹⁶ Given the directional hypotheses, significance tests are one-tailed unless otherwise noted.

Unpatriotic and *Americans Unpatriotic* variables are not statistically significant. The one that is significant (*Americans Unpatriotic* in the PROUD model) is signed in the wrong direction.

[Table 3 here]

Moving on to Hypothesis 5 (effect of patriotic/unpatriotic norms on evaluations of government), we again used ordered probit regression to test the influence of the four treatments on the dependent variables (CORRUPT and DEMOCRACY). See the last two columns of Table 3. As expected, the coefficients on the *Muslim Americans Patriotic* and *Americans Patriotic* variables are positive and statistically significant ($p < .001$). Also as expected, the coefficients on the *Muslim Americans Unpatriotic* and *Americans Unpatriotic* variables are negative and, in three of four cases, statistically significant as well ($p < .05$). These findings support Hypothesis 5.

In order to convey the size of these effects, we present two graphs in Figure 1. For each experimental group separately, we present the means and confidence intervals for two variables: one symbolic patriotism measure (CITIZEN) and one evaluation of government measure (DEMOCRACY).¹⁷ The effects of the patriotic stimuli are quite large substantively across Figures 1a and 1b, at least doubling the control group means. With respect to the effects of the *unpatriotic* stimuli: in Figure 1a, the means of participants in the unpatriotic conditions are nearly identical to the control group; in Figure 1b, however, the means of those who received the unpatriotic stimuli are between one-half and a full point lower on the five-point response scale.¹⁸ Note that patterns for the three patriotism questions not depicted are highly

¹⁷ Here, as well as in Figure 2, we display variable means instead of predicted values.

¹⁸ We discuss possible reasons for this divergence in the Discussion and Conclusion.

similar to Figure 1a, and patterns for the corruption question, also not depicted, are similar to Figure 1b.

[Figures 1a and 1b here]

While we expected to find a close link between the treatments and symbolic patriotism and evaluations of government, in Hypothesis 6, we surmised that the treatments would *not* extend to measures of substantive democratic participation. To test this hypothesis, we regressed the three participation measures (CONTACT, PERSUADE, and SUPPORT) onto the four treatment variables, again using ordered probit regression. See Table 4. Overall, the treatments did *not* influence participants' stated intentions to participate politically—11 of the 12 coefficients are statistically insignificant. These (non)findings support Hypothesis 6.

[Table 4 here]

Next, we examine Hypothesis 7: whether the size of the various treatment effects varied according to the *identity* of the norm holders depicted in the stimuli—Muslim Americans or Americans in general. Here, we focus only on the six dependent variables for which treatment effects were expected (and found): symbolic patriotism and evaluations of government. A quick look at Table 3 suggests that the effects do not vary considerably by the identity group depicted. To test this impression formally, we used Chi-squared tests of the equivalence of the relevant coefficients in each model. For example, after estimating the FLAG model, we tested whether 1) the coefficients on the *Muslim Americans Patriotic* and the *Americans Patriotic* treatment variables were equal, and 2) the coefficients on the *Muslim Americans Unpatriotic* and the *Americans Unpatriotic* treatment variables were equal. Twelve tests were conducted (two for each of the six models). These tests were all statistically *insignificant* (at least $p > .20$,

two-tailed), meaning that the two coefficients in each pair were not statistically different from each other. These findings support Hypothesis 7, which expected such similar treatment effects.

Finally, we test Hypothesis 8—the supposition that African American Muslims would be less responsive to Muslim American norms than their counterparts. For the sake of completeness, we regressed the six symbolic patriotism and evaluative dependent variables on all four treatment variables, participants’ racial self-identification (1 = African American; 0 = other),¹⁹ and all interactions between these variables. We focus on the *Muslim Americans Patriotic* stimulus which consistently generated large and statistically significant effects. If our hypothesis is correct, coefficients on the MAP (Muslim Americans patriotic) x African American interaction term should be negative, indicating relatively lower responsiveness to the stimulus among African Americans. See the shaded row in Table 5. This coefficient is negative in four of the six cases and statistically significant in three. These findings offer partial support for Hypothesis 8.

[Table 5 here]

The significant interactions are graphed in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. The effect lines are flatter for African Americans—particularly in the third figure—indicating that the difference between the treatment and control group is smaller than for non-African Americans. In other

¹⁹ Participants were placed in the African American category if they chose African American or African as their racial identification and if they were born in the United States.

words, on average, African American Muslims appeared to be less influenced by Muslim American patriotic norms than non-African American Muslims.

[Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c here]

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our experimental findings demonstrate the ability of patriotic group norms to shape Muslim Americans' expressed symbolic patriotism. Muslim American participants who were told that patriotism was a popular norm among Muslim Americans *or* Americans in general reported considerably higher levels of symbolic patriotism than the control group, both in terms of expected behavior (flying the U.S. flag / celebrating the 4th of July) and expressed attitudes (being proud to be American / preferring U.S. citizenship). This suggests that other American minority subgroups who express lower levels of symbolic patriotism than the American polity generally (see Schildkraut 2011; Sidanius et al. 1997) might increase their expressed patriotism if exposed to information that their peers (within the subgroup and nation) are highly patriotic.

Expressed patriotism (attitudinal and behavioral) in our study approximately doubled in response to the two patriotic treatments. We can contextualize these findings by examining relevant results from surveys of the American public generally. Surveys conducted by Pew in 2010 included two questions similar to our questions on American pride and displaying the flag (Pew 2010a, 2010b); both indicate high levels of patriotism among Americans—with mean pride at about 4 (out of 5) and a clear majority of respondents (59%) reporting flying the flag. In our study: With respect to pride, means rose from approximately 2 in the control group to about 3.5 in the two treatment groups (also out of 5, although question wording differed); with respect to flag display, means (out of 4) rose from below 2 to almost 3 (i.e., on average,

participants will “probably” display the American flag in the future). In sum, participants who received either patriotic treatment expressed levels of patriotism approaching those of the public at large, whereas control group patriotism was low by comparison.²⁰

The effects of perceived patriotic norms extended to other variables as well: the belief that the U.S. government is (not) corrupt and support for democracy. Mean levels of these dependent variables also *decreased* somewhat in response to *unpatriotic* norms. These additional results demonstrate how closely tied symbolic or affective sentiments vis-à-vis the nation are to a variety of substantive evaluations of government.

On the other hand, and as expected, perceiving patriotism to be popular or unpopular did *not* influence participants’ expected political participation. This makes sense given that the symbolic patriotism concept focuses on allegiance to, and admiration for, the nation, but says

²⁰ Given that our sample is not representative, we cannot generalize this descriptive statistic to U.S. Muslims in general. This said, it would not be surprising if Muslim Americans’ symbolic patriotism was low compared to the public at large, particularly at the time of our study (2009). First, although a majority of U.S. Muslims are citizens (approximately 70%), a majority are also immigrants. And immigrant populations tend to have lower levels of patriotism because they are recently arrived and retain ties to their nation of origin. Second, levels of patriotism among Muslim Americans may have been especially low when we conducted our study due to dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration’s treatment of domestic and foreign Muslims. It is well-established that perceived discrimination by majority institutions and group members is negatively associated with patriotism (Citrin and Sears 2014; Schildkraut 2014).

little about individuals' commitment to being a part of the democratic process. In part because of this previously established null relationship, scholars have argued that additional measures of patriotism are needed to capture other varieties that do predict political participation. For example, "constructive patriotism" includes a combination of loyalty to the nation and an openness to questioning and criticizing it in service of preserving the nation's core values or improving the lives of the nation's citizens (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Staub 1997). While this article focuses on symbolic patriotism, future work on Muslim Americans ought to examine constructive patriotism as well given Muslim Americans' high rates of political participation.

We also found that Muslim American and mainstream American norms were equally influential over our participants on average. The fact that the findings reveal equal influence on participants is important. After more than a decade of elevated distrust of Muslim Americans by non-Muslims in the U.S., some may be relieved to learn that study participants were just as attentive to "American" norms as "Muslim American" ones, while others may be disappointed that "American" norms were not more influential than "Muslim American" ones.²¹ Either way, the findings suggest that these hyphenated Americans' dual identifications are psychologically real and politically consequential.

²¹ An interesting question for future research is whether Americans who are members of majority subgroups, such as whites and/or Christians, would show a similar pattern or would be pulled *more* toward "American" norms. Given that majority group members tend toward relatively greater national identification (Citrin and Sears 2014), this difference may emerge.

Looking at the political impact of multiple identities from a different perspective, we found that not all Muslim American participants conformed equally to that community's norms. In particular, African American Muslims were less responsive to Muslim American patriotic norms than their non-African American counterparts. This suggests that African American Muslims are probably less responsive to Muslim American norms in general, as the qualitative literature on the identity rift between African American and non-African American Muslims would suggest. This said, because the observed differences were modest in size and were not consistently statistically significant, the results should not be taken to mean African American and non-African American Muslims do not share a common identity or influences. The findings point to differences in *degree* of identification and influence, not to differences in kind.

While we argue that this is the most significant aspect of intersectionality worth exploring in the data, other identity differences within the Muslim American community could generate different levels of conformity to either Muslim American or American patriotic norms. In particular, differences in whether or not an individual was born in the U.S. may matter, and, further, might explain the slightly different patterns for African Americans (who are much less likely to be immigrants). To test this possibility, we added interactions between the four treatment variables and whether a participant was born in the U.S. (as well as this variable on its own) to each of the interactive models in Table 5. These additions generally did not substantively change the coefficients on the treatment x race variables discussed above (although the size of the relevant coefficient in the "democracy" model was noticeably reduced), and no clear pattern of results emerged with respect to the treatment x U.S. born

interactions.²² Some may be surprised by this null result, as one might expect those born in the U.S. to be more responsive than others to “American” norms. However, previous research on immigrant communities has found that identification with the nation, and acculturation in general, differs much more between the 2nd and 3rd generation than between the 1st and 2nd (e.g., see Citrin and Sears 2014, p. 158), the generational difference likely dominant in our data.

Returning to the formal hypotheses, one set of results stood out as quite unexpected. The unpatriotic stimuli did *not* influence participants’ levels of symbolic patriotism. We offer two possible explanations. The first relates to the fact that control group means for our dependent variables were relatively low, which may have created a floor effect. While means could have decreased slightly, it would have been impossible for average levels of symbolic patriotism to *decrease* in the unpatriotic conditions as much as they *increased* in the patriotic conditions. In support of this explanation for the null results, the two dependent variables that *were* lower in the unpatriotic conditions than the control group—perceived (lack of) corruption and support for democracy—had higher control group means than the four patriotism items.

A second explanation relates to the difference between the descriptive and injunctive aspect of norms. As we have argued, most norms have both of these qualities, with both pressing in the same direction—the attitudes or behaviors of the majority are also normatively desirable. Our experimental treatments mainly manipulated the *descriptive* aspect of norms, leaving the injunctive aspect largely implicit. However, it is likely that many study participants

²² We also explored moderation according to religiosity, gender, and age, but these analyses likewise did not yield any clear patterns of statistically significant results.

were conscious of the injunctive aspect of patriotism in the U.S. Thus, for them, the “unpatriotic” treatments communicated a description of popular attitudes and behavior at odds with normatively desirable attitudes and behavior. Some participants may have resisted “following the crowd” for this reason. We are able to test this intuition by taking advantage of two questions that measured participants’ emotions following the stimuli. Participants were asked: “Reflecting on these survey results, do they make you feel [embarrassed or ashamed] [proud, or good about yourself] at all?”²³ If a significant number of participants believed patriotism to be an injunctive norm in the U.S. at the time of the study, then, on average, those who received an unpatriotic treatment should have felt *more* ashamed, and *less* proud, than those who received a patriotic treatment.²⁴ Each relevant comparison of means (Americans patriotic vs. unpatriotic; Muslim Americans patriotic vs. unpatriotic; pride and shame assessed separately) is in the correct direction and statistically significant (all $p < .001$). These results offer strong support for this second explanation.

On a related note, some may wonder whether the fact that our study focused on Muslim Americans—a fact likely recognized by many participants given several questions on Islam—increased participants’ desire to be “politically correct,” and whether we might understand the null experimental results in these terms. We do not think self-censorship is the

²³ Answers were on a five-point scale, ranging from “no” to “extremely.”

²⁴ This logic follows social identity theory. An individual’s self-esteem is based in part on the status of the groups to which s/he belongs. Normatively undesirable behavior by in-group members reflects poorly on the individual, leading to a loss of self-esteem (Turner [1978] 2010).

precise issue, as low control group means for symbolic patriotism suggest participants were generally honest. However, building on the preceding discussion, if participants felt they were being scrutinized *as Muslims*, it is possible this intensified their resistance to the “unpatriotic” treatments. Feeling that they were representing their marginalized group, participants may have felt greater responsibility to resist common sentiments they knew to be normatively undesirable. By this logic, it is also possible that a feeling of scrutiny intensified conformity to the “patriotic” norms. We hope future experimental research will take up the question of how perceptions of scrutiny may moderate norm conformity among minority group members.

Overall, our study generated a novel and important set of findings regarding the influence of perceived patriotic norms on Muslim American individuals’ patriotism levels as well as the political relevance of this group’s multiple identities—religious, national, and racial. While our study included only Muslim Americans, the expectations tested were generated in large part from social scientific literature on the American populace generally. Thus, we think it is likely that many of these findings would generalize to other American subgroups. We encourage other researchers to test this hypothesis with additional empirical research.

This research project opens other avenues for future research as well. For example, we have posited that, because individuals identify with multiple groups, they conform to multiple groups’ norms. The experiment discussed in this article was a simple one, with each participant only reading about one group’s norms. What might result if each participant read about the norms of two, or more, of their identity groups? If two groups’ norms are nearly identical, does influence double? If norms point in opposite directions, which groups’ norms prevail?

Finally, we hope our study generates future research on the underpinnings of patriotic expression, generally speaking. Because patriotism is so popular in the U.S., many see its occurrence as a given. Our research adds to recent studies suggesting that patriotism is not a given but is instead constructed, largely at the individual level. Each person has his or her own reasons for embracing (or, less often, rejecting) the nation. In sum, our suspicion is that social conformity plays a stronger role in *all* Americans' expressed patriotism than most of us realize.

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TABLES

Table 1: Experiment Sample Compared to 2007 Pew Survey of Muslim Americans

| | Answer category | Our study | Answer category | Pew 2007 |
|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| Race | Arab | 27 | White | 38 |
| | Asian | 19 | Asian | 20 |
| | African | 15 | Black | 26 |
| | African American | 31 | | |
| | Other / Mixed | 7 | Other / Mixed | 14 |
| | Answer category | Our study | Pew 2007 | |
| Religious affiliation | Shi'a | 10 | | 16 |
| | Sunni | 67 | | 50 |
| | Nation of Islam | 2 | | |
| | Other | 21 | | 34 |
| Born in U.S. | Yes | 45 | | 35 |
| | No | 55 | | 65 |
| Gender | Male | 54 | | 54 |
| | Female | 46 | | 46 |
| Age | 18-29 | 40 | | 30 |
| | 30-39 | 24 | | 26 |
| | 40-54 | 18 | | 31 |
| | 55+ | 18 | | 13 |
| Education | Less than high school | 10 | | 21 |
| | High school grad | 23 | | 32 |
| | Some college | 29 | | 23 |
| | College grad | 29 | | 14 |
| | Grad degree | 10 | | 10 |

Note: Above percentages reflect proportions calculated from coded responses only; missing data have been excluded. Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding error.

Table 2: Dependent Variables

| Behavioral Symbolic Patriotism | |
|---|---|
| In the future, do you plan to display the American flag at your home, on your car, or in your office or business? | No, definitely not (1) to Yes, definitely (4) |
| This coming year, do you plan to celebrate the 4 th of July Holiday? | No, definitely not (1) to Yes, definitely (4) |
| Attitudinal Symbolic Patriotism | |
| I would rather be a citizen of America than any other country. | Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) |
| I am proud to be an American. | Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) |
| Evaluations of government | |
| Most of the people running the U.S. government are corrupt. | Strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5) |
| Democracy is the best form of government. | Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) |
| Participation | |
| During the next year or two, do you: Plan to write, email, or call your member of Congress to voice your opinion on an issue? | No (1); maybe (2); yes (3) |
| Do you plan to try to persuade family members, friends, or neighbors to be more active politically? | No (1); maybe (2); yes (3) |
| Do you plan to actively support a candidate you like for local political office (for example, mayor or school board)? | No (1); maybe (2); yes (3) |

Table 3: Effects of Treatments on Symbolic Patriotism and Trust in Government

| | Plan to display flag | Plan to celebrate July 4 | Rather be American citizen | Proud to be American | U.S. government corrupt (reversed) | Democracy best form government |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Muslim Americans Patriotic | 1.144*** (.167) | 1.606*** (.173) | 1.370*** (.179) | 1.349*** (.178) | .711*** (.162) | .942*** (.169) |
| Muslim Americans Unpatriotic | -.026 (.168) | -.049 (.170) | .121 (.181) | .243 (.181) | -.274* (.159) | -.183 (.172) |
| Americans Patriotic | .980*** (.167) | 1.402*** (.169) | 1.469*** (.178) | 1.442*** (.178) | .835*** (.164) | 1.020*** (.169) |
| Americans Unpatriotic | .056 (.166) | .019 (.169) | .056 (.177) | .385* (.176) | -.331* (.162) | -.409* (.178) |
| μ_1 | -.010 (.118) | -.011 (.118) | -.108 (.132) | -.005 (.128) | -1.300 (.131) | -.255 (.122) |
| μ_2 | .789 (.122) | 1.005 (.126) | .603 (.133) | .668 (.133) | -.221 (.114) | .319 (.123) |
| μ_3 | 1.488 (.134) | 1.845 (.143) | 1.168 (.140) | 1.223 (.139) | .401 (.115) | .791 (.127) |
| μ_4 | | | 2.046 (.159) | 1.919 (.150) | 1.139 (.123) | 1.554 (.140) |
| N | 437 | 436 | 390 | 384 | 414 | 398 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.077 | 0.147 | 0.109 | 0.089 | 0.062 | 0.086 |

*Note: Ordered probit regression with treatment variables (control group is excluded comparison group). Parameter estimates displayed with standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests one-tailed: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$*

Table 4: Null Effects of Treatments on Democratic Participation

| | Contact Congress member | Persuade peers to participate | Support local candidate |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Muslim Americans Patriotic | -.267 (.179) | .354* (.173) | .058 (.185) |
| Muslim Americans Unpatriotic | -.235 (.180) | .262 (.177) | .278 (.185) |
| Americans Patriotic | -.143 (.177) | .159 (.174) | .083 (.182) |
| Americans Unpatriotic | -.106 (.177) | .048 (.174) | .179 (.180) |
| μ_1 | -.286 (.124) | .018 (.124) | .120 (.126) |
| μ_2 | .638 (.126) | 1.155 (.133) | 1.125 (.135) |
| N | 385 | 419 | 376 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.004 |



*Note: Ordered probit regression with treatment variables (control group is excluded comparison group). Parameter estimates displayed with standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests one-tailed: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$*

Table 5: African Americans Less Responsive to Muslim American Patriotic Norms

| | Plan to display flag | Plan to celebrate July 4 | Rather be American citizen | Proud to be American | U.S. government corrupt (reversed) | Democracy best form government |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Muslim Americans Patriotic | 1.379*** (.205) | 1.527*** (.203) | 1.594*** (.218) | 1.248*** (.208) | .799*** (.194) | 1.311*** (.209) |
| Muslim Americans Unpatriotic | .018 (.209) | -.142 (.208) | .200 (.226) | .166 (.222) | -.261 (.194) | -.165 (.215) |
| Americans Patriotic | 1.143*** (.207) | 1.442*** (.204) | 1.488*** (.218) | 1.285*** (.213) | .918*** (.199) | .998*** (.206) |
| Americans Unpatriotic | .078 (.204) | -.066 (.204) | .126 (.219) | .435* (.212) | -.253 (.194) | -.229 (.217) |
| African American | .286 (.241) | -.072 (.250) | .351 (.266) | -.069 (.272) | .278 (.236) | .501* (.248) |
| MAP x African American | -.732* (.352) | .280 (.363) | -.667* (.371) | .403 (.383) | -.286 (.349) | -1.069** (.355) |
| MAU x African American | -.123 (.353) | .271 (.361) | -.227 (.378) | .224 (.384) | -.074 (.341) | -.078 (.362) |
| AP x African American | -.450 (.344) | -.108 (.351) | -.020 (.362) | .488 (.371) | -.271 (.345) | .147 (.353) |
| AU x African American | -.027 (.354) | .276 (.366) | -.187 (.374) | -.151 (.381) | -.261 (.352) | -.542 (.381) |
| μ_1 | .086 (.145) | -.033 (.141) | .012 (.162) | -.029 (.152) | -1.222 (.148) | -.096 (.149) |
| μ_2 | .893 (.150) | .982 (.148) | .728 (.164) | .647 (.156) | -.137 (.134) | .488 (.150) |
| μ_3 | 1.599 (.160) | 1.83 (.162) | 1.295 (.169) | 1.209 (.162) | .486 (.136) | .971 (.154) |
| μ_4 | | | 2.183 (.187) | 1.914 (.172) | 1.225 (.144) | 1.765 (.167) |
| N | 437 | 436 | 390 | 384 | 414 | 398 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.082 | 0.149 | 0.114 | 0.093 | 0.064 | 0.101 |


Note: Ordered probit regression with treatments interacted with African American identification (African American = 1). Parameter estimates displayed with standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests one-tailed: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Figures 1a-b: Means of Experimental Groups for Two Dependent Variables



Note: Experimental group means for two representative dependent variables. Because one-tailed significance tests are used throughout the article, error bars represent +/- 1.65 of the standard error of the mean.

Figures 2a-c: Significant Interactions between *Muslim Americans Patriotic Treatment* and African American



Note: Control and Muslim Americans Patriotic treatment group means, for African Americans and non-African Americans separately.